ALAS2-2026-3885

`openvt -u` is intended to identify the owner of the current VT and then execute `login` as that user from a privileged context. In the documented `kbrequest`/init usage, the ownership test in `authenticate_user()` relies on `stat("/proc/<pid>/fd/0")`. `stat()` on `/proc/<pid>/fd/0` follows the symlink to the underlying TTY device node. As a result, `buf.st_uid` reflects the owner of the TTY node rather than the owner of the process holding the file descriptor. If the TTY owner returns to `root` or the getty owner after logout while an unprivileged process still has `fd 0` attached to that TTY, the check can incorrectly treat that process as belonging to the privileged console owner. Once that check succeeds, the `-u` path executes a passwordless login as the selected user. In the documented `kbrequest`/init deployment using `openvt -us`, this can result in passwordless `login -f root` on the spawned VT. This report establishes that privilege escalation path for that documented deployment; it does not claim equivalent reachability for deployments that do not use `openvt -u` from a privileged `kbrequest`/init path. (CVE-2026-72693)

aarch64:
    kbd-1.15.5-15.amzn2.0.1.aarch64
    kbd-debuginfo-1.15.5-15.amzn2.0.1.aarch64

i686:
    kbd-1.15.5-15.amzn2.0.1.i686
    kbd-debuginfo-1.15.5-15.amzn2.0.1.i686

noarch:
    kbd-misc-1.15.5-15.amzn2.0.1.noarch
    kbd-legacy-1.15.5-15.amzn2.0.1.noarch

src:
    kbd-1.15.5-15.amzn2.0.1.src

x86_64:
    kbd-1.15.5-15.amzn2.0.1.x86_64
    kbd-debuginfo-1.15.5-15.amzn2.0.1.x86_64